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Decision making in dynamic and interactive environments based on
cognitive hierarchy theory, Bayesian inference, and predictive control
Sisi Li, Nan Li, Anouck Girard, and Ilya Kolmanovsky
Abstract—In this paper, we describe an integrated frame-
work for autonomous decision making in a dynamic and
interactive environment. We model the interactions between
the ego agent and its operating environment as a two-player
dynamic game, and integrate cognitive behavioral models,
Bayesian inference, and receding-horizon optimal control to
define a dynamically-evolving decision strategy for the ego
agent. Simulation examples representing autonomous vehicle
control in three traffic scenarios where the autonomous ego
vehicle interacts with a human-driven vehicle are reported.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many autonomous systems, including collaborative robots
[1] and self-driving cars [2], operate in dynamic and inter-
active environments. As an example, a self-driving car may
operate in traffic with multiple other cars, which inform the
environment. The environment is dynamic and interactive
because the other cars not only operate concurrently with the
ego car but also respond to its actions [3]. It is important for
such autonomous systems to account for these interactions
in decision making to ensure safe and effective operations,
especially for systems interacting with humans. Despite
much progress made, this problem remains challenging and
unsolved in many application scenarios [2], [4].
Strategic interactions between intelligent agents can be
modeled using game theoretic frameworks [5], among which
cognitive hierarchy theory has drawn attention from game
theorists and practitioners since the 90’s [6], [7] due to its
potential for more accurate prediction of human behavior
compared to equilibrium-based theories shown in many
experimental studies [8], [9]. Cognitive hierarchy theory
describes human thought processes in strategic games by
characterizing human behavior based on levels of iterated
rationalizability. In particular, it assumes bounded ratio-
nality of decision makers in contrast to the assumption
of unbounded/perfect rationality in many equilibrium-based
theories. The assumption of bounded rationality can be more
realistic than that of unbounded rationality in many practical
situations because the reasoning capability of a decision
maker is often limited by the complexity of the decision
problem and the time available to make a decision [10].
In this paper, we describe a decision making frame-
work for autonomous systems, which integrates cognitive
hierarchy theory, Bayesian inference of cognitive level,
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and receding-horizon optimization applied to a partially
observable Markov decision process formulation to define
a dynamically-evolving decision strategy, where hard con-
straints can also be imposed and probabilistically enforced
over the planning horizon to incorporate safety requirements.
We note that although cognitive hierarchy theory has been
utilized for modeling multi-agent interactions in the literature
[3], [13], [14], [15], most of the existing works exploit a
“level-k thinking” framework [6], [7], which assumes that
a level-k decision maker treats the interactive environment
as a level-(k − 1) decision maker and responds to it ac-
cordingly. Unfortunately, level-k decision rules may lead to
poor decisions if the (k−1)-assumption about the interactive
environment’s cognitive level is incorrect [16].
Therefore, we consider another framework that is related
to “level-k thinking” but has distinguishing features, called
the “cognitive hierarchy” framework [17], where CH-k deci-
sions are optimized to strategically respond to the interactive
environment by modeling it using a mixture of level-σ, σ =
0, · · · , k−1, decision-maker models. The cognitive hierarchy
framework enables the autonomous agent to strategically
interact with environments with different cognitive levels.
When the autonomous agent has good knowledge about its
operating environment, the mixing ratio of level-σ models
could be pre-specified [18]. When operating in an uncertain
environment, reasoning about the interactive environment’s
cognitive level could be incorporated in the decision making
process. In particular, unlike the approaches in [15], [16],
[19] relying on heuristic techniques to obtain level estimates,
the level reasoning algorithm in this paper is based on
Bayesian inference, which may have a broader applicability.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
formulate the decision making problem of an autonomous
agent operating in a dynamic and interactive environment as
a dynamic game. In Section III, we review two related but
distinct frameworks of cognitive hierarchy theory, the level-k
framework and the cognitive hierarchy framework. In Sec-
tion IV, we describe our integration of cognitive hierarchy
theory, Bayesian inference of cognitive level, and receding-
horizon optimization applied to a constrained partially ob-
servable Markov decision process formulation to determine
the ego agent’s decision strategy. In Section V, we apply the
proposed decision making framework to autonomous vehicle
control in three interactive traffic scenarios. Discussion and
conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a decision making process by
an intelligent agent operating in a dynamic and interactive
environment. The interactions between the ego agent and
the environment are modeled as a two-player dynamic game
represented as a 6-tuple,
〈
P,X,U, T,R,C
〉
, (1)
where P = {1, 2} represent the two players with 1 denoting
the ego agent and 2 denoting the environment; X is a finite
set of states with xt ∈ X denoting the state of the agent-
environment system at the discrete time instant t; U = U1×
U2 is a finite set of actions with U1 denoting the action
set of the ego agent and U2 denoting the action set of the
environment; T represents a transition of the state xt → xt+1
as a result of an action pair (u1t , u
2
t ) ∈ U , in particular, T is
defined by the following dynamic model,
xt+1 = T (xt, u
1
t , u
2
t ); (2)
R = {R1, R2} are reward functions of the two players
representing their decision objectives, in particular,
Rit = R
i(xt, u
1
t , u
2
t ), i ∈ P, (3)
i.e., each player’s reward at the time instant t depends on the
state xt and both players’ actions (u
1
t , u
2
t ); and C = {Xt}t∈N
with Xt ⊆ X being a set of “safe” states, representing hard
constraints for decision making of the ego agent.
We consider a receding-horizon optimization-based pro-
cess for the decisions of the ego agent,
(u1t )
∗ =
{
(u10|t)
∗, · · · , (u1N−1|t)
∗
}
∈ (4a)
argmax
u1
τ|t
∈U1, τ=0,··· ,N−1
N−1∑
τ=0
λτR1
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
)
,
s.t. xτ+1|t ∈ Xt+τ+1, ∀ τ = 0, · · · , N − 1, (4b)
where uiτ |t denotes a prediction of player i’s action at the
time instant t+ τ over a planning horizon of length N with
the prediction made at the current time instant t, xτ |t denotes
a prediction of the system state under the sequence of action
pairs
{
(u1τ |t, u
2
τ |t)
}N−1
τ=0
, and λ ∈ (0, 1] is a factor to discount
future rewards.
Clearly, the above optimization problem is not well-
defined yet, as the uncontrolled variables
{
u20|t, · · · , u
2
N−1|t
}
are unknown. One way to proceed is to consider worst-case
scenarios, i.e., replace (4a) with
(u1t )
∗ ∈ argmax
u1
τ|t
∈U1
min
u2
τ|t
∈U2
N−1∑
τ=0
λτR1
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
)
. (5)
However, as (5) assumes an adversarial player 2, rather than
a rational player 2 that pursues its own objectives and is not
necessarily against the ego agent, (5) may lead to overly-
conservative decisions for the ego agent. Therefore, we
pursue an alternative solution, which is to exploit cognitive
hierarchy theory to predict player 2’s actions.
III. TWO COGNITIVE HIERARCHY FRAMEWORKS
Cognitive hierarchy theory is concerned with behavioral
models describing human thought processes in strategic
games. It characterizes human behavior based on levels of
iterated rationalizability. Two frameworks have been de-
veloped based on cognitive hierarchy theory: the level-k
framework [6], [7] and the cognitive hierarchy framework
[17], which are related but have distinct features. They are
reviewed in what follows.
A. The level-k framework
In the level-k framework, it is assumed that each player in
a strategic game bases its decision on a finite depth of rea-
soning about the likely actions of the other players, which is
referred to as its “cognitive level.” In particular, the reasoning
hierarchy starts from some non-strategic behavioral model,
called level-0. Then, a level-k player, k = 1, 2, · · · , assumes
that all other players are level-(k − 1), based on which it
predicts the actions of the other players and makes its own
decision as the optimal response to these predicted actions.
In short, a level-k decision optimally responds to level-(k−1)
decisions.
The level-k framework has been exploited for modeling
human-human, human-machine, and machine-machine1 in-
teractions in automotive systems [3], [16], [19], aerospace
systems [13], [14], as well as in cyber-physical security [15].
It has been revealed in [16] that an ego agent using a decision
strategy corresponding to a level-k model with some fixed
k may behave poorly when interacting with another agent
using a decision strategy of level-σ with σ 6= k − 1.
B. The cognitive hierarchy framework
The cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework is similar to the
level-k framework in terms of characterizing each player’s
behavior also by a cognitive level k. The unique feature of the
CH framework is the hypothesis that a player can act under
the assumption that some percentage of the population fits
each archetype. More specifically, a CH-k player assumes
that each of the other players is level-σ for some σ < k
and optimizes its decision corresponding to its beliefs about
the other players’ levels. This feature makes a CH-k player
“smarter” than a level-k player by enabling a CH-k player to
optimally respond to level-σ decisions for all σ < k as long
as it has the correct beliefs about the other players’ levels.
On the basis of this observation, algorithms that estimate
the other agents’ cognitive levels according to their historical
behavior have been proposed in [15], [16], [19] so that
the ego agent can adapt its decision strategy to the level
estimates.
IV. DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK EXPLOITING
COGNITIVE HIERARCHY THEORY
In this section, we describe our decision making frame-
work that integrates cognitive hierarchy theory, Bayesian
inference, and receding-horizon optimal control.
1On the basis of the fact that many machine systems pursue human-like
decision making, e.g., in [20].
A. Level-k models of the environment
A policy pii, i ∈ P , is a stochastic map from states X to
actions U i. Specifically, pii : X × U i → [0, 1] is such that
P(uit = u|xt = x) = pi
i(x, u), (6)
for all t ∈ N, where P(·|·) denotes conditional probability.
To define the level-k models of the environment for
arbitrary k = 0, 1, · · · , we start from defining a level-0model
of the ego agent, defined by a policy pi1,0, and a level-0
model of the environment, defined by a policy pi2,0. The
level-k model of the environment, pi2,k, with k ≥ 1 is then
constructed based on the “softmax decision rule” [21], which
captures the suboptimality and variability in decision making
[22], [23], as follows,
pi2,k(x, u) =
exp
(
Q2,k(x, u)
)
∑
u′∈U2 exp
(
Q2,k(x, u′)
) , (7)
in which the Q-function of state-action pairs is defined as
Q2,k(x, u) = max
u2
τ|t
∈U2, τ=1,··· ,N−1
(8)
E
{N−1∑
τ=0
λτR2
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
) ∣∣∣ x0|t = x, u20|t = u, pi1,k−1
}
,
where pi1,k−1 is the level-(k − 1) model of the ego agent,
which for k ≥ 2 is defined as
pi1,k−1(x, u) =
exp
(
Q1,k−1(x, u)
)
∑
u′∈U1 exp
(
Q1,k−1(x, u′)
) , (9)
in which
Q1,k−1(x, u) = max
u1
τ|t
∈U1, τ=1,··· ,N−1
(10)
E
{N−1∑
τ=0
λτR1
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
) ∣∣∣ x0|t = x, u10|t = u, pi2,k−2
}
.
In short, the level-k model of the environment is con-
structed based on the level-(k − 1) model of the ego agent,
which is constructed based on the level-(k − 2) model of
the environment. Therefore, the level-k models of the envi-
ronment as well as the level-k models of the ego agent are
constructed recursively for k = 0, 1, · · · . We note that when
constructing the level-k models of the ego agent, we drop the
hard constraints (4b) to reduce computational complexity but
can promote their satisfaction through imposing penalties in
the reward function R1.
B. Decision making based on the CH framework
After the level-k models of the environment pi2,k for
k = 0, 1, · · · , kmax have been constructed, we define the
augmented state of the agent-environment system as xt =
[xt, σ]
⊤, where σ ∈ K = {0, 1, · · · , kmax} represents the
actual cognitive level of the environment and is assumed to
be unknown to the ego agent. Then, we consider the fol-
lowing augmented dynamic model of the agent-environment
system,
xt+1 = f(xt, u
1
t , u
2
t ) =
[
T (xt, u
1
t , u
2
t )
σ
]
, (11a)
yt = g(xt) = xt, (11b)
where yt = xt ∈ X is referred to as an “observation.” On the
basis of the level-k policies, the action of the environment, u2t
in (11a), can be viewed as a stochastic disturbance satisfying
P(u2t = u|xt = x, σ = k) = pi
2,k(x, u), (12)
for all u ∈ U2 and (x, k) ∈ X ×K .
It is assumed that the ego agent has a prior belief about
σ, as a probability distribution, P(σ = k), defined over K =
{0, 1, · · · , kmax}. Let us collect all historical observations
up to time t and all previously executed actions by the ego
agent up to time t− 1 into a data vector,
ξt =
{
y0, · · · , yt, u
1
0, · · · , u
1
t−1
}
, (13)
which, roughly speaking, will be used by the ego agent as
evidence to infer the actual cognitive level of the environ-
ment, i.e., to obtain the posterior belief about σ, P(σ = k|ξt),
defined for all k ∈ K .
Then, we consider the following decision making process
by the ego agent,
(u1t )
∗∈ argmax
u1
τ|t
∈U1
E
{N−1∑
τ=0
λτR1
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
) ∣∣∣ ξt
}
, (14a)
s.t. P
{
xτ+1|t ∈ Xt+τ+1, ∀ τ = 0, · · · , N − 1
∣∣ ξt} ≥ 1− ε,
(14b)
where ε ∈ [0, 1] defines a required level of confidence in
constraint satisfaction.
Comparing the processes (4) and (14), we can observe two
major differences: Firstly, the unknowns
{
u20|t, · · · , u
2
N−1|t
}
in (4) have been modeled as stochastic disturbances in (14),
which is achieved in (12) by exploiting the level-k models of
the environment pi2,k. Secondly, to account for the stochas-
ticities, the objective has been changed from maximizing the
value of a function in (4a) to maximizing the expected value
of the function in (14a), and the hard constraint (4b) has
been changed to a probabilistic requirement of satisfaction,
i.e., the chance constraint (14b) with ε ∈ [0, 1] being a design
parameter. We note that (14) is a well-defined optimization
problem, and we present a solution method for it based on the
algorithm developed in [11], [12] in the following section.
C. Solution method
Considering randomized decision rules, we transform the
optimization problem (14) defined in the decision space
(U1)N to the optimization problem (16) defined in the space
of probabilities as follows:
Firstly, we define γ1τ |t, τ = 0, · · · , N − 1, as a probability
distribution over the set U1, based on which the predicted
action u1τ |t is chosen, i.e.,
P(u1τ |t = ul) = γ
1
τ |t(ul), ∀ul ∈ U
1. (15)
Then, we reformulate (14) as the following optimization
problem:
(Γ1t )
∗ =
{
(γ10|t)
∗, · · · , (γ1N−1|t)
∗
}
∈ (16a)
argmax
γ1
τ|t
∈∆1, τ=0,··· ,N−1
E
{N−1∑
τ=0
λτR1
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
) ∣∣∣ ξt
}
,
s.t. P
{
xτ+1|t ∈ Xt+τ+1, ∀ τ = 0, · · · , N − 1
∣∣ ξt} ≥ 1− ε,
(16b)
where ∆1 =
{
γ ∈ [0, 1]|U
1| :
∑|U1|
i=1 γi = 1
}
is the (|U1| −
1)-dimensional probability simplex.
The problem (14) along with its transformation (16) is
referred to as a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP) with a time-joint chance constraint, where the
partial observability comes from the unobservability of the
hidden state σ ∈ K . A solution method for general problems
in the form of (16) has been described in [11], [12]. In par-
ticular, the following Propositions 1 and 2, which represent
matrix-computational implementations of the corresponding
mathematical expressions in [11], [12] applied to the specific
problem setting of this paper, are used in solving (16).
Proposition 1: Suppose that the reward functionR1 can be
written as R1
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
)
= R1
(
xτ+1|t
)
, where xτ+1|t
represents the next state transitioned from
(
xτ |t, u
1
τ |t, u
2
τ |t
)
through the dynamic model (2). Then, for any given Γ1t , it
holds that
E
{N−1∑
τ=0
λτR1
(
xτ+1|t
) ∣∣∣ ξt
}
=
(
R
1
)⊤(N−1∑
τ=0
λτpiτ+1|t
)
,
(17)
where R1 =
[
R1(x1), · · · , R
1(x|X×K|)
]⊤
is a vector col-
lecting the reward values associated with every xi ∈ X×K ,
in which R1(x) = R1
(
(x, k)
)
= R1(x), and piτ+1|t =[
P(xτ+1|t = x1|ξt), · · · , P(xτ+1|t = x|X×K| |ξt)
]⊤
is a
vector representing the predicted distribution of the aug-
mented state.
Proof: The result follows from
E
{N−1∑
τ=0
λτR1
(
xτ+1|t
) ∣∣∣ ξt
}
=
N−1∑
τ=0
λτE
{
R1
(
xτ+1|t
) ∣∣∣ ξt
}
=
N−1∑
τ=0
λτ
( ∑
x∈X×K
R1
(
x
)
P
(
xτ+1|t = x
∣∣ ξt)
)
,
and the definitions of R1 and piτ+1|t. 
In particular, the reward vector R1 is constructed offline
and the distribution vector piτ+1|t is computed online using
the recursive formula,
piτ+1|t =
(
I|X×K| ⊗ (γτ |t)
⊤
)
diag
(
P(x1), · · · , (18)
P(x|X×K|)
) (
1|X×K| ⊗ piτ |t
)
,
in which I|X×K| denotes the |X ×K|-dimensional identity
matrix, 1|X×K| denotes the |X × K|-dimensional all-ones
vector, ⊗ represents the Kronecker product, and
P(xi) =
[
P(xi|u1), · · · , P(xi|u|U1|)
]⊤
, (19)
P(xi|ul) =
[
P(xi|x1, ul), · · · , P(xi|x|X×K|, ul)
]⊤
,
with P(xi|xj , ul) representing the transition kernel of the
augmented state, constructed offline as
P
(
(xi, ki)
∣∣(xj , kj), ul) (20)
=
∑
u2∈U2
(
I{(xi,ki)}
(
T (xj, ul, u
2), kj
)
pi2,kj (xj , u
2)
)
,
with IA(b) denoting the set-membership indicator function.
The recursive formula (18) starts with the initial term
pi0|t, the posterior belief about the augmented state inferred
according to the evidence ξt, which is updated at every
decision step using the Bayesian inference formula,
pi0|t(xi) =
I{yt}×K(xi)P(xi|u
1
t−1)
⊤pi0|t−1∑|X×K|
j=1
(
I{yt}×K(xj)P(xj |u
1
t−1)
⊤pi0|t−1
) .
(21)
Proposition 2: For any given Γ1t , the left-hand side of
the constraint (16b) can be evaluated using the following
algorithm:
1) Initialize τ = 0, pv = 0, and piv0|t = pi0|t.
2) Update
pivτ+1|t =
(
I|X×K| ⊗ (γτ |t)
⊤
)
diag
(
P(x1), · · · ,
P(x|X×K|)
) (
1|X×K| ⊗ pi
v
τ |t
)
.
3) Update
pv ← pv +
∑
x /∈Xt+τ+1×K
pivτ+1|t(x).
4) If τ = N − 1 then go to Step 5); otherwise update
pivτ+1|t(x)← 0, ∀x /∈ Xt+τ+1 ×K,
τ ← τ + 1 and go to Step 2).
5) Output
P
{
xτ+1|t ∈ Xt+τ+1, ∀ τ = 0, · · · , N−1
∣∣ ξt} = 1−pv.
Proof: The steps 2), 3) and 4) realize, respectively, the
recursive formulas (29), (28), and (30) of Theorem 1 in [11].
Therefore, the proof follows from Theorem 1 of [11]. 
On the basis of Propositions 1 and 2, a standard nonlinear
programming solver exploiting gradient and Hessian infor-
mation of the cost and constraint functions of (16), which
can be numerically estimated based on function evaluations
for any Γ1t of interest, can be used to solve for (Γ
1
t )
∗.
V. APPLICATION TO AUTONOMOUS DRIVING IN
INTERACTIVE TRAFFIC SCENARIOS
In the near to medium term, autonomous vehicles will
operate in traffic together with human-driven vehicles. Ensur-
ing safety while maintaining performance in the associated
interactive traffic scenarios remains a challenging problem
for autonomous vehicle control [2]. In this section, we apply
the proposed decision making framework to controlling an
autonomous ego vehicle in traffic scenarios where it needs to
interact with a human-driven vehicle. The traffic scenarios we
consider include a four-way intersection scenario, a highway
overtaking scenario, and a highway forced merging scenario.
Decision making of the human-driven vehicle is modeled
based on the level-k framework described in Section III-A.
Experimental studies [8], [9] suggest that humans are most
commonly level-1 or level-2 reasoners. Therefore, we con-
sider level-1 and level-2 models in the form of (7). Note that
different human drivers may have different cognitive levels,
and the autonomous ego vehicle does not know in advance
the specific level, σ, of the human driver it is interacting
with but has to infer σ based on its observed information.
When without any information at step t = 0, we initialize
the ego vehicle’s beliefs in level-1 and level-2 models of the
human-driven vehicle as 0.5 and 0.5.
In all of the three traffic scenarios discussed in this section,
we use the following discrete-time model to represent vehicle
kinematics in the longitudinal direction,[
si,jt+1
vi,jt+1
]
=
[
1 ∆t
0 1
] [
si,jt
vi,jt
]
+
[
∆t2
2
∆t
]
ai,jt , (22)
where s denotes position, v denotes velocity, a denotes
acceleration, the subscript t represents the discrete time, the
first superscript i ∈ {1, 2} distinguishes the autonomous
ego vehicle 1 from the human-driven vehicle 2, the second
superscript j ∈ {x, y} denotes the x or y-direction, and
∆t = 1 [s] is the sampling period. We model lane changes
as instantaneous events, i.e., completed in one time step. The
acceleration a, taking values in a finite acceleration set A,
and the lane change command are the actions to be decided
on.
As described in Section III-A, in order to formulate the
level-k models of the human-driven vehicle, pi2,k, we need
to define the level-0 models of both vehicles, pi1,0 and pi2,0.
Following [16], [19], we let a level-0 vehicle select actions
to maximize the same reward function as that for level-1
and 2 vehicles but treat other vehicles on road as stationary
obstacles. Note that “as stationary obstacles” defines a way
to predict the other vehicle’s actions in the decision making
process (4), so the ego vehicle’s optimal actions, and hence
the level-0 policy, can be determined.
A. Intersection
As shown in Fig. 1, the autonomous ego vehicle (blue car)
encounters a human-driven vehicle (red car) at an unsignal-
ized four-way intersection. Both vehicles are driving straight
through the intersection. Such an objective is represented by
the following reward function,
Ri = si,j , (23)
where (i, j) = (1, x) for the autonomous ego vehicle and
(i, j) = (2, y) for the human-driven vehicle.
In the formulated receding-horizon optimization problem
(4), we choose the planning horizon as N = 3, which is
shown in our simulations to be effective for the autonomous
ego vehicle to resolve the conflict with the human-driven
vehicle in such an intersection-encounter scenario.
Moreover, given the safety requirement to maintain the
positions in the safe set,
Ω :=
{
(s1, s2) | ‖s1 − s2‖2 ≥ 1.2 lcar
}
, (24)
where si =
[
si,x, si,y
]⊤
, ‖·‖2 represents the Euclidean norm,
and lcar = 5 [m] is the car length, we impose the following
chance constraint over the planning horizon,
P
{
(s1τ |t, s
2
τ |t) ∈ Ω, ∀ τ = 1, · · · , N
∣∣ ξt} ≥ 0.99. (25)
Figs. 1(a-1) and (a-2) show two subsequent steps in the
simulation of autonomous ego vehicle interacting with a
level-1 human-driven vehicle, and Figs. 1(b-1) and (b-2)
show those of interacting with a level-2 human-driven ve-
hicle. When interacting with a level-1 human-driven vehicle,
which, on the basis of our level-0 model introduced above,
represents a cautious/conservative driver, the autonomous
ego vehicle decides to drive through the intersection first.
When interacting with a level-2 human-driven vehicle (ag-
gressive, based on our specified level-0 model), the au-
tonomous ego vehicle yields the right of way to the human-
driven vehicle. The autonomous ego vehicle responds to the
two different human drivers in different ways because it gains
knowledge of the human driver’s cognitive level by observing
his/her actions for the first few steps after which it can predict
his/her future actions and respond optimally.
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Fig. 1. Intersection scenario. (a-1) and (a-2) show two subsequent steps in
the simulation of autonomous ego vehicle (blue car) interacting with a level-
1 human-driven vehicle (red car); (b-1) and (b-2) show those of interacting
with a level-2 human-driven vehicle.
B. Overtaking
The second scenario we consider is shown in Fig. 2,
where the autonomous ego vehicle (blue car) is overtaking a
human-driven vehicle (red car). A similar scenario has been
considered in [11], [12] but not in a game theoretic setting.
We consider the following reward function,
Ri = 8si,x − si,y, (26)
where the first term is used to encourage the autonomous
ego vehicle to overtake the human-driven vehicle, and the
second term is used to penalize the autonomous ego vehicle
for driving in the left passing lane so that it is encouraged
to come back to the right traveling lane after the overtaking
as quickly as it can.
We choose the planning horizon as N = 3 and impose a
chance constraint over the planning horizon in the form of
(25) where the safe set Ω is now defined as
Ω :=
{
(s1, s2) |
(
|s1,x − s2,x| ≥ 1.6 lcar
)
(27)
∨
(
|s1,y − s2,y| ≥ wlane
)}
,
in which wlane = 3.6 [m] is the lane width. The safe set (27)
represents the requirement that overtaking can occur only
when the two vehicles are traveling in different lanes, other-
wise they shall keep a reasonable distance in the longitudinal
direction to improve safety.
Figs. 2(a-1)-(a-4) show four subsequent steps in the sim-
ulation of autonomous ego vehicle interacting with a level-1
human-driven vehicle, and Figs. 2(b-1)-(b-4) show those of
interacting with a level-2 human-driven vehicle. We note that
in this simulation the maximum speed of the human-driven
vehicle is restricted to be smaller than that of the autonomous
ego vehicle to ensure the possibility of an overtaking. When
interacting with a level-1 driver, the autonomous ego vehicle
completes the overtaking relatively quickly because, as can
be seen in Fig. 2(a-2), the level-1 driver drives slowly to
let it cut in. When interacting with a level-2 driver, the
autonomous ego vehicle needs to drive in the passing lane
for a longer period of time before it can come back to the
traveling lane.
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Fig. 2. Overtaking scenario. (a-1) to (a-4) show four subsequent steps in
the simulation of autonomous ego vehicle (blue car) interacting with a level-
1 human-driven vehicle (red car); (b-1) to (b-4) show those of interacting
with a level-2 human-driven vehicle.
C. Merging
The last scenario we consider is a highway forced merging
scenario. Differently from overtaking, which may improve
travel speed but is usually unnecessary, merging, oftentimes,
has to be accomplished within a certain road section. We
consider the scenario shown in Fig. 3, where the autonomous
ego vehicle (blue car) originally driving in the right lane
needs to merge into the traffic in the left lane. In particular,
the merging can only be and has to be accomplished within
the road section with the grey-dashed lane marking.
We consider the reward function
Ri = si,x + 10si,y (28)
in the receding-horizon optimization (14), where the first
term is used to encourage the autonomous ego vehicle to
maintain a reasonable travel speed and the second term is
used to encourage it to merge into the left lane. For the safe
set, we choose
Ω :=
{
(s1, s2)
∣∣
[
(|s1,x − s2,x| ≥ 1.6 lcar) ∨ (|s
1,y − s2,y| ≥ wlane)
]
∧[(
(s1,x ≤ 20) ∧ (s1,y =
wlane
2
)
)
∨
(
20 < s1,x ≤ 100
)
(29)
∨
(
(s1,x > 100) ∧ (s1,y =
3wlane
2
)
)]}
in the chance constraint (25) so that the autonomous ego
vehicle has to merge into the left lane within the road section
specified by (29). The planning horizon is again chosen as
N = 3.
Subsequent steps in the simulation with a level-1 human-
driven vehicle (red car) traveling in the left lane are shown
in Figs. 3(a-1)-(a-4), and those with a level-2 human-driven
vehicle are in Figs. 3(b-1)-(b-4). When the human-driven
vehicle is level-1, which, on the basis of our level-0 model
introduced at the beginning of Section V, represents a
cautious/conservative driver, the autonomous ego vehicle
decides to merge into the left lane ahead of the human-driven
vehicle. When the human-driven vehicle is level-2, which
represents an aggressive driver, the autonomous ego vehicle
merges behind the human-driven vehicle as it predicts that
the human-driven vehicle will likely not yield.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we described a framework integrating cog-
nitive behavioral models, Bayesian inference, and receding-
horizon optimal control for autonomous decision making in
a dynamic and interactive environment with uncertainty.
In the current version of the framework, the environment,
which responds to the ego agent’s actions, is modeled as
a single intelligent agent with a certain cognitive level σ.
Simulation examples representing traffic scenarios where
an autonomous ego vehicle interacts with a human-driven
vehicle illustrate the application of the current version of the
framework. When the environment is composed of multiple
intelligent agents, the proposed framework may be extended,
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Fig. 3. Merging scenario. (a-1) to (a-4) show four subsequent steps in the
simulation of autonomous ego vehicle (blue car) interacting with a level-1
human-driven vehicle (red car); (b-1) to (b-4) show those of interacting with
a level-2 human-driven vehicle.
where each of the other agents, i = 2, 3, · · · , is modeled
separately as a level-σi decision maker and the ego agent
estimates each σi according to agent i’s historical behavior.
We envision that such an extension is mainly a computational
challenge rather than a theoretical one. Addressing it is left
as a topic to future research.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Guiochet, M. Machin, and H. Waeselynck, “Safety-critical advanced
robots: A survey,” Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 94, pp. 43–
52, 2017.
[2] W. Schwarting, J. Alonso-Mora, and D. Rus, “Planning and decision-
making for autonomous vehicles,” Annual Review of Control, Robotics,
and Autonomous Systems, vol. 1, pp. 187–210, 2018.
[3] N. Li, D. W. Oyler, M. Zhang, Y. Yildiz, I. Kolmanovsky, and A. R.
Girard, “Game theoretic modeling of driver and vehicle interactions
for verification and validation of autonomous vehicle control systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, vol. 26, no. 5, pp.
1782–1797, 2018.
[4] M. A. Goodrich, A. C. Schultz, et al., “Human–robot interaction: a
survey,” Foundations and Trends R© in Human–Computer Interaction,
vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 203–275, 2008.
[5] R. B. Myerson, Game theory. Harvard university press, 2013.
[6] R. Nagel, “Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study,”
The American Economic Review, vol. 85, no. 5, pp. 1313–1326, 1995.
[7] D. O. Stahl and P. W. Wilson, “On players’ models of other players:
Theory and experimental evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior,
vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 218–254, 1995.
[8] M. A. Costa-Gomes and V. P. Crawford, “Cognition and behavior
in two-person guessing games: An experimental study,” American
Economic Review, vol. 96, no. 5, pp. 1737–1768, 2006.
[9] M. A. Costa-Gomes, V. P. Crawford, and N. Iriberri, “Comparing mod-
els of strategic thinking in van huyck, battalio, and beil’s coordination
games,” Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 7, no.
2-3, pp. 365–376, 2009.
[10] G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, Bounded rationality: The adaptive
toolbox. MIT press, 2002.
[11] N. Li, I. Kolmanovsky, and A. Girard, “Tractable stochastic predictive
control for partially observable Markov decision processes with time-
joint chance constraints,” in Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 3276–3282.
[12] N. Li, A. Girard, and I. Kolmanovsky, “Stochastic predictive control
for partially observable Markov decision processes with time-joint
chance constraints and application to autonomous vehicle control,”
Journal of Dynamic Systems, Measurement, and Control, vol. 141,
no. 7, p. 071007, 2019.
[13] Y. Yildiz, A. Agogino, and G. Brat, “Predicting pilot behavior in
medium-scale scenarios using game theory and reinforcement learn-
ing,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, 2014.
[14] N. Musavi, D. Onural, K. Gunes, and Y. Yildiz, “Unmanned aircraft
systems airspace integration: A game theoretical framework for con-
cept evaluations,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, 2016.
[15] A. Kanellopoulos and K. G. Vamvoudakis, “Non-equilibrium dynamic
games and cyber–physical security: A cognitive hierarchy approach,”
Systems & Control Letters, vol. 125, pp. 59–66, 2019.
[16] N. Li, I. Kolmanovsky, A. Girard, and Y. Yildiz, “Game theoretic
modeling of vehicle interactions at unsignalized intersections and
application to autonomous vehicle control,” in American Control
Conference (ACC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 3215–3220.
[17] C. F. Camerer, T.-H. Ho, and J.-K. Chong, “A cognitive hierarchy
model of games,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119, no. 3,
pp. 861–898, 2004.
[18] N. Abuzainab, W. Saad, and H. V. Poor, “Cognitive hierarchy theory
for heterogeneous uplink multiple access in the internet of things,” in
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). IEEE, 2016,
pp. 1252–1256.
[19] R. Tian, S. Li, N. Li, I. Kolmanovsky, A. Girard, and Y. Yildiz,
“Adaptive game-theoretic decision making for autonomous vehicle
control at roundabouts,” in Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC). IEEE, 2018, pp. 321–326.
[20] H. Yu, H. E. Tseng, and R. Langari, “A human-like game theory-based
controller for automatic lane changing,” Transportation Research Part
C: Emerging Technologies, vol. 88, pp. 140–158, 2018.
[21] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto, Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
MIT press, 2018.
[22] J. M. Beck, W. J. Ma, X. Pitkow, P. E. Latham, and A. Pouget,
“Not noisy, just wrong: the role of suboptimal inference in behavioral
variability,” Neuron, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 30–39, 2012.
[23] L. Acerbi, S. Vijayakumar, and D. M. Wolpert, “On the origins of
suboptimality in human probabilistic inference,” PLoS Computational
Biology, vol. 10, no. 6, p. e1003661, 2014.
